Abstract-Due to the expectedly higher density of mobile devices and exhaust of radio resources, the fifth generation (5G) mobile networks introduce small cell concept in the radio access technologies, so-called Small Cell Networks (SCNs), to improve radio spectrum utilization. However, this increases the chance of handover due to smaller coverage of a micro base station, i.e., home eNodeB (HeNB) in 5G. Subsequently, the latency will increase as the costs of authenticated key exchange protocol, which ensures entity authentication and communication confidentiality for secure handover, also increase totally. Thus, this work presents a secure region-based handover scheme (ReHand) with user anonymity and fast revocation for SCNs in 5G. ReHand greatly reduces the communication costs when UEs roam between small cells within the region of a macro base station, i.e., eNB in 5G, and the computation costs due to the employment of symmetry-based cryptographic operations. Compared to the three elaborated related works, ReHand dramatically reduces the costs from 82.92% to 99.99%. Nevertheless, this work demonstrates the security of ReHand by theoretically formal proofs.
I. Introduction
F IFTH generation (5G) mobile communication networks play as a key role in not only communication technologies, but also the internet-of-things (IoT) technologies. It has the holistic enhancement in the radio access technologies (RATs) and communication infrastructures for the new data/information exchange requirements in IoT. For example, millimeter wave, device-to-device communications, and small cell networks, etc., are to provide better quality of services (QoS), utilization of radio resource and bandwidth, higher transmission rate, and lower latency for various of emerging applications [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] .
To achieve this objective, we need a more efficient network architecture with robust security to meet the demands of application performance in next decade. To meet those demands, research projects [6] , [1] , [7] have focused on 5G mobile communication networks that provide a flexible, reliable, and high-performance network architecture for wireless communication beyond 2020. Owing to the upcoming IoT [8] and the increase in the use of mobile devices [9] , a considerably higher capacity of wireless networks is required. In the future, connections on the wireless system will increase rapidly and will be more complex. 5G also emphasizes much lower latency and higher data rate for users. By decreasing the latency, we can improve the stability of data transmission and provide realtime services. Increasing the data rate for each user enables more advanced applications, such as high-definition (HD) mobile television (mobile-TV) and mobile clouds.
Several notable technologies have been addressed in 5G, including support of IPv6, Flat-IP based network, pervasive networks, power efficiency technology, massive machine-type communications, and small cell networks, etc [10] , [11] , [12] , [9] , [1] , [13] , [14] , [15] . In recent years, several researches and technical reports surveyed a wide range of information of 5G [16] , [17] , [7] , [18] , [19] . These provided several diverse collections of 5G features and their own comments. As a result, 5G is an important future trend in the next decade, and it will be established in 2020.
Our research focuses on one of these main technical trends, known as small cell networks (SCNs), a new concept of infrastructures under the macro cellular coverage [20] . Types of small cells include femto-, pico-, and micro-cells, which provide different levels of coverage and abilities. The smallest cells, i.e., femto cells, have a coverage area of an office, whereas the pico and micro cells have coverage of a building and a community, respectively. Macro cells do not communicate with user terminals directly but focus on the management and connectivity of small cells in an urban scope.
A. Small Cell Networks
The basic architecture of small cell networks in 5G consists of user equipment (UE), eNodeB/Home eNodeB (eNB/HeNB), security gateway (SeGW), home subscribe server (HSS), and authentication center (AuC) [13] , [14] , [15] . A UE obtains the communication services via HeNB/eNB using RATs. Mobility management entity (MME) manages the mobility of UEs by processing the handover requests and updating the tracking areas of UEs. At the very beginning, each HeNB has to perform mutual authenticated key exchange with SeGW for establishing a secure channel among them. A handover process occurs when a UE changes its visiting eNB/HeNB when the signal from the connected eNB/HeNB becomes weaker. When the handover process occurs, the UE and the new eNB/HeNB should authenticate the mutual legality and exchange a session key for the following secure communications. For better utilization of radio resources, small cell technology in 5G deploy more base stations with smaller coverage, i.e., HeNBs. Compared to the service capacity of macro cell, each small cell can serve the same number of UEs in a smaller coverage, so that the density of UEs is enhanced.
Access control in 5G is essential to provide the functions correctly in the system, i.e., both UE and infrastructure should be able to identify if the counterpart of each other is legal or not. Besides, the confidentiality of the subsequent communications is also required. Generally, access control and secure communication are guaranteed by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. The design of AKE in SCN is more challenging as its performance requirement is more critical since the latency might increase significantly due to higher chance of handover caused by the smaller coverage of radio access networks. Hence, a new design of AKE to reduce the costs of AKE in handover is necessary to fulfill the performance requirements of supporting real-time applications in 5G. Additionally, the user anonymity to conceal the footprint of communications should be considered to guarantee privacy as more and more personal and sensitive information is involved in applications.
B. Related Work
A notable amount of roaming-based AKE protocols have been proposed and user anonymity has been carefully deliberated in [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] . In mobile networks, an UE should complete authentication for identity identification prior to requesting for services when roaming to the coverage of a new visiting foreign network (FN). The user anonymous authentication prevents eavesdroppers or/and FN from exposing the real identities of UEs in every authentication session such that the footprints of communications of UEs are concealed.
User anonymity can be separated into two levels, partial user anonymity and full user anonymity. Partial user anonymous authentication conceals identities from eavesdroppers, excluding FNs [21] , [22] , [23] and full user anonymous authentication additionally considers FNs as eavesdroppers [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [30] , [31] , [32] . With full user anonymity, traceability and revocability are essential to support the permitted network operators to trace and revoke user identities for management purposes. Diverse traceability and revocability techniques [24] , [25] , [30] have been developed to manage the anonymity protection in roaming-based mobile networks. However, in order to provide strong user anonymity, the costs of revocation and tracing are commonly considerably high in certain roaming-based AKE schemes. In [32] , the system revokes the users by updating user private keys periodically. In [31] , a time-bound user anonymity AKE is proposed to reduce the costs of revocation checking by eliminating the revoked users, whose credentials expire naturally. Overall, the aforementioned elegant works resolves privacy protection requirements for roaming-based AKE. However, the revocation and tracing costs for management purposes might be enlarged for SCNs in 5G. Thus, an efficient design of roaming-based AKE for secure handover with user anonymity is urgently required to fit the features of SCNs.
C. Difference between 4G and 5G
There are significant differences between the current 4G and 5G communication networks such as connection principles and infrastructures. In 4G, the UE should connect to the macro cell base station, i.e., the eNB, during the handover process to an adjacent macro cell [33] . Depending on the service area of the eNB or HeNB, UEs in 4G might connect to the eNB directly if their signals can be detected by the eNB. UEs can enhance their connections to the macro cell through relay nodes (RNs), which are a variation of base stations deployed at the coverage edge of macro cells in 4G. In this manner, the 4G coverage can be enhanced.
In 5G, UEs cannot connect to the macro cells directly because the macro cells do not broadcast beacon frames anymore. The user terminals in 5G can only connect to the macro cell via the help of the HeNBs in small cells [33] . The infrastructure of 5G includes a massive increase in the number of HeNBs.
Therefore, the operational performance in small cell technology of the original 4G design is inefficient when it applies to the new architecture of 5G. Besides, a vulnerable handover procedure will suffer from the higher risks of impersonation and eavesdropping attacks due to more infrastructural components in 5G. In order to enhance the performance and guarantee the security of small cell networks in 5G, it is essential to design a fast handover authentication mechanism, which is secure, efficient, and tailored to the design principles of 5G.
Contributions
In this paper, we propose a region-based secure handover authentication scheme for small cell network in 5G with the following contributions: 1) the design of region-based fast authentication reduces the communication and computation costs without involving the components of core networks when roaming to a new visiting micro cell within the same region of a macro cell; 2) user anonymous authentication of roaming to a new macro cell guarantees identity anonymity against disclosure of communication footprints; 3) user membership revocation by accumulated one-way hash eliminates the costs of managing all revoked users in 5G system; 4) this work proposes a metrics to evaluate the performance of region-based fast handover authentication compared to the other related works; 5) the paper proves the security of the proposed scheme fulfilling the security definitions by theoretical proofs. 
II. System and Security Models
This section introduces the proposed system model, the security requirements, the security model, the corresponding security definitions of 5G small cell networks.
A. System Model
This section introduces the system model of small cell networks, including the proposed security architecture and mobility, by referring to 3GPP 5G standards [34] . The entire 5G network consists of RAN and evolved packet core (EPC), also known as core network. In 5G RAN, there are different types of RANs regarding their transmission coverage, transmission power, service capacity, and application scenario (e.g., indoor or outdoor), such as macrocell, microcell, picocell, and femtocell. Macrocell is the RAN of the largest coverage supported by eNBs, and microcell, picocell, and femtocell are the RANs of smaller coverage supported by HeNBs. As depicted in Fig. 2 , a UE may attach to an eNB or HeNB, for services provided by the core network, i.e., EPC, in mobile networks. A eNB attaches to EPC directly and HeNB may attach to an eNB or EPC directly. Before serving the UE, both UE and EPC have to complete AKE to verify the legitimacy of both parties and establish a shared session key to secure the following communications. The entire AKE procedure involves UE, eNB/HeNB, MME, and HSS/AuC. The UE and the HSS/AuC shares a common long-term secret key. Hence, in AKE, the MME will request the HSS/AuC to generate the required authentication token and verify the authentication messages from the UE, respectively. The UE can generate authentication token and verify the authentication messages from the MME by the shared secret with the HSS/AuC. Once the AKE is completed, both UE and MME will share the same secret key material. The MME will also send the derived session keys to the eNB/HeNB for the subsequent secure communications with the UE.
Handover. For traditional mobility model to small cell networks, when the UE roams to a new HeNB, it has to perform a complete AKE with the components of EPC. This naturally increases the latency of communications, especially more handovers in small cell networks. Hence, the mobility model of the proposed scheme defines a Region, which is formed by an eNB and its belonging HeNBs. The eNB and HeNBs within the same region will share the same group secret key for performing region-based fast handover AKE. Thus, the entire authentication with MME and HSS/AuC is required, when the UE roams to a new visiting region. The UE only need to perform fast handover AKE, when the UE roams to a HeNB within the visited region without involving the MME and HSS/AuC.
B. Security Requirements
• Authenticated Key Exchange: Before mobile services, the 5G security system should ensure identity identification through mutual authentication between UE and the system components in RAN and EPC. Additionally, both UE and 5G security should be able to exchange a session key securely to protect the subsequent communications.
• Identity Anonymity: The identity anonymity guarantees that any two communication sessions from the same UE is unlinkable to any outsider eavesdropper. Hence, the identity of each UE for every communication session should be randomized to avoid the traceability of footprint of communications.
• Fast Authentication: In order to enhance the performance of authentication, UE performs authentication protocol with only nearest component, e.g., HeNB, eNB, etc. It should be able to reduce the latency caused by the communications with and computation on MME and HSS/AuC in the core network.
• Active/Passive Revocation: Revocation is an essential function to ensure that the subscription of each UE can be revoked in case of expiration or suspension of services. In the proposed 5G security system, the system will issue a temporary group key for fast authentication when the UE roams to the coverage of new serving eNB. The temporary group key can be revoked passively when it is expired. The system can also revoke the given temporary group keys of the user by issuing revocation lists for the specified eNBs and HeNBs.
• Traceability: In order to locate UEs for certain services, such as incoming calling services and short message service, the system should be able to identify the location of each UE even if the anonymous identity is used to conceal the footprints of communications.
C. Security Definitions Definition II.1. Matching Conversations [35] The proposed protocol Π in the presence of an adversary E and consider two oracles, Π which engaged in a matching conversation under the presence of a polynomial time adversary E. Note that k is a security parameter, A, B ∈ I, and s, t ∈ N . Definition II.3. Secure Mutual Authentication [35] We say that Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol if for any polynomial time adversary E, Definition II.4. Distinguish sk E (k) [35] Let Distinguish sk E (k) be the event that an adversary E can correctly guess that she/he is given the real session key or a random number after the protocol is performed and terminates successfully, where k is a security parameter. Definition II.5. A secure mutual authentication and key exchange protocol [35] A protocol Π is a secure mutual authentication and key exchange protocol if the following properties are satisfied:
1. Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol. : (The probability of
Definition II.6. The game for INDistinguishability under the Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA) [36] A challenger ψ and a polynomial time adversary Γ play the following game with a symmetric cryptosystem Π.
• Step 1. ψ runs a setup algorithm. ψ gives Γ the resulting public parameters params. An encryption oracle E sk and the decryption oracle D sk are given a key sk. The above oracles hold the secret key secretly.
• Step 2. Γ issues a sequence of encryption and decryption queries. Upon receiving an encryption query, denoted by m * , ψ returns π
Challenge: Γ outputs a plaintext pair (m 0 , m 1 ). Upon receiving (m 0 , m 1 ), ψ randomly chooses θ ∈ {0, 1} and computes the ciphertext π = E sk (m θ ). Then, ψ returns π to Γ.
• Step 3. Γ issues a sequence of encryption and decryption queries as those in
Step 2 where a restriction here is that π * ≠ π. Guess: Finally, Γ outputs θ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If θ ′ = θ, Γ will win the game.
The polynomial time adversary Γ participated in the game is referred to as an IND-CCA adversary with the guessing advantage Adv
Definition II.7. IND-CCA Security We can say that a symmetric cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CCA secure if no polynomial time adversary Γ within running time t, has guessing advantage Adv
(Γ) ≥ ε after performing the game of Definition II.6.
Definition II.8. The game for indistinguishability under a pseudorandom permutation and a random permutation (PRP) [37] A challenger ψ and a polynomial time adversary Γ play the following game with a pseudorandom permutation Ω.
• Step 1. ψ runs a setup algorithm. ψ gives Γ the resulting public parameters params. There are two oracles, Ω and Ω −1 , which are the pseudorandom permutation and its inverse, respectively. Ω can be regarded as an encryption function and Ω −1 can be regarded as the decryption function. Ω and Ω −1 know a secret key k. ω and ω
−1
are the random permutation and its inverse, respectively. The random permutation ω is regarded as an encryption function and ω −1 is regarded as the decryption function.
• Step 2. Γ issues a sequence of Ω k and Ω
Case I: Γ sends a plaintext ρ to ψ with a restriction that ρ is different from each ρ * in Step 2. ψ randomly chooses θ ∈ {0, 1} and computes π = Ω k (ρ) when θ = 0 or π = ω(ρ) when θ = 1. Then, ψ returns π to Γ. Case II: Γ sends a ciphertext π to ψ with a restriction that π is different from each π * in Step 2. ψ randomly chooses θ ∈ {0, 1} and computes
Then, ψ returns ρ to Γ.
• Step 3. Γ issues a sequence of Ω k and Ω −1 k queries as those in Step 2 where restrictions here are that ρ * ≠ ρ and π * ≠ π. Guess: Finally, Γ outputs θ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If θ ′ = θ, Γ will win the game. The polynomial time adversary Γ participated in the game is referred to as a PRP adversary with the guessing advantage Adv
Definition II.9. Pseudorandom Permutation Security (PRP Security) If no polynomial time adversary Γ within running time t, has the advantage Adv P RP Ω (Γ) ≥ ε after performing the game of II.8, then the function Ω ∶ K Ω × Z → Z can be considered as a (t, ε)-secure pseudorandom Permutation [37] . Note that K Ω is the key space of key k and Z = {0, 1} n where n is a security parameter.
The guessing advantage of Γ is Adv
. Note that ω is a random permutation selected uniformly from the set of all bijections on Z, and k is chosen randomly from the set of key space K Ω .
Definition II.10. Pseudorandom Function Security (PRF Security) If no polynomial time adversary Γ within running time t, has the advantage Adv P RF Λ (Γ) ≥ ε after performing the game of II.8, then the function Λ ∶ K Λ × Z → Z can be considered as a (t, ε)-secure pseudorandom Function [38] . Note that K Λ is the key space of key k and Z = {0, 1} n where n is a security parameter.
Note that λ is a random function selected uniformly from the set of all bijections on Z, and k is chosen randomly from the set of key space K Λ .
III. Preliminaries

A. One-Way Accumulator
One-way accumulator firstly introduced by J. Benaloh and M. de Mare in 1993 [39] is a one-way hash function with a quasi-commutative property for the purpose of testing membership without the help of a trusted authority. ⋆Definition 1: one-way hash function [39] A family of One − way hash f unctions is an infinite set of functions h l ∶ X l × Y l → Z l having the following properties:
1. There exists a polynomial P such that for each integer l, h l (x, y) is computable in time P (l, x , y ) for all x l ∈ X l and all y l ∈ Y l . 2. There is no polynomial P such that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which, for all sufficiently large l, will when given l, a pair (x, y) ∈ X l × Y l , and a y ′ ∈ Y l , find an x ′ ∈ X l such that h l (x, y) = h l (x ′ , y ′ ) with probability greater than 1 P (l) when (x, y) is chosen uniformly among all elements of X l × Y l and y ′ is chosen uniformly form Y l .
⋆Definition 2: Quasi-commutativity [39] A function f ∶ X × Y → X is said to be quasi − commutative if for all x ∈ X and for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y , f (f (x, y 1 ), y 2 ) = f (f (x, y 2 ), y 1 ). ⋆Definition 3: Nyberg's One-way accumulator [40] A family of one − way accumulators is a family of oneway sh functions with quasi-commutativity. The one-way accumulator by K. Nyberg [40] is constructed based on the generic symmetry-based hash function (e.g., SHA) and simple bit-wise operations. Compared to Benaloh's scheme [39] , Nyberg's scheme is more efficient without employing asymmetric cryptographic operations. Assume that the upper bound to the number of accumulated items is N = 2 d where d is a positive integer and let one-way hash function h ∶ {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l=r×d , where r is a positive integer. Let x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m be the accumulated items with different string sizes and y i is the hashing value for each x i , such that {y i = h(x i )} i∈ [1,m] , where m ≤ N . y ij can be represented as y i = (y i,1 , ..., y i,r ), for y ij ∈ {0, 1} d and j = 1, ..., r. Next, we replace y i,j by a single bit. If y i,j is a string comprised of d 0s, it is replaced by 0. Otherwise, y i,j is replaced by 1. Since there are r substrings of y i,j , y i can be mapped to a string
The b i,j denotes the j th bit of b i and the probability of b i,j = 0 is 2 −d . In this way, we can transfer an accumulated item x i to a bit string b i of length r which can be considered as a value of r independent binary random variable if h is an ideal hash function. Let H N yb () denote Nyberg's fast oneway hash function and ⊙ be the bitwise operation AND. The accumulated function on an accumulated item X with an accumulated key K can be described as
And it also can be described as
As the bitwise operation AND obeys the commutativity rule, the quasi-commutativity of H N yb () can be achieved and
On the other hand, the operation AND as a logic multiplication operation also has the property of absorbency, which can be expressed as "A ⊙ A = A ". Hence,
To verify the membership of an item x i on the accumulated value Z expressed as (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a r ),
.., b i,r ) and check that whenever b i,j = 0 then a j = 0 for all j = 1, ..., r. Using the property of absorbency, one can verify whether an item x i within the accumulated value Z by H N yb (Z,
The security proof of Nyberg's one-way accumulator [40] is based on the availability of a long, truly random hash code which provides strong one-wayness property. In other words, it can be proven secure in the Random Oracle Model [41] , [42] .
IV. Proposed Scheme
The proposed region-based fast authentication introduces the concept of regional warrants, where each region is formed by the coverage of a macro cell, which includes one eNB and several belonging HeNBs. A UE will be issued a regional warrant when visiting a new region and completing the Initial Handover protocol. When the UE roams to another HeNB within the same region, the region-based fast handover authentication will be performed with the assistant of MME and HSS/AuC. Hence, the fast handover authentication greatly reduces the communication latency. Our protocol also provides an active revocation function such that the operator can revoke UE's warrant actively when the membership of UE is changed. . The notations used in our protocols are shown in Table I .
A. Overview and Key Management
The proposed scheme contains five phases, Initialization, Registration, Initial Handover, Region-based Fast Handover, and Active Revocation. First, the Initialization phase introduces the initialization of the parameters of macro cells (eNB), small cells (HeNBs), the MME, and the HSS/AuC. The Registration phase presents the procedures of registering a new UE joining with its identity and security information in the mobile network. How a user joins a new visiting region and gets a warrant, which is generated by the eNB of the region, are shown in the Initial Handover phase. The Region-based Fast Handover phase presents that how a UE and the visiting HeNB authenticate each other when the user moves from one small cell to another. Finally, we present an active revocation function in the Active Revocation phase.
Let the region covered by eNB be the macro cell, the regions covered by HeNBs be the small cells, and UEs be the mobile user terminals. 
B. Initialization
This phase produces the required parameters as follows: -Step 1: In order to form a region of fast handover, the HSS/AuC issues a group key GK j , blind factors {bR I j } I∈ [1,k] for identity anonymization, to each eNB j and its belonging HeNBs.
-Step 2: The HSS/AuC issues a long-term secret key K i for each UE i as the shared long-term secret between them.
It also selects an anonymous identity rID i and computes pID i = E K H (rID i ) for each UE i. 
C. Registration
UE i registers to the system securely and share the private parameters with the HSS/AuC. -Step 1: UE i registers to the system with the identity information ID i and the registration required information.
The mobile user will be issued a SIM card, which is temperresistant and stores the personal identity and secret, i.e.,ID i , and K i , for her/his mobile device.
D. Initial Handover
When a UE i roams to the coverage of a new HeNB belonging to a newly visiting eNB j, it should process the following steps to get a timeliness warrant from the system. The UE i can, therefore, access the network by running the region-based handover process with each HeNB in the same coverage of the eNB with the warrant until it expires.
In order to preserve identity privacy, the real identity ID i of UE i should be hidden during transferring data. The HSS/AuC and eNBs/HeNBs take pID i as a label so that they can extract the corresponding K i and rID i for the following authentication and key exchange. -Step 1: UE i chooses a one-time key d at random and sends {pID i , C 1 = E Ki (pID i , d)} to the new visiting HeNB. -Step 2: When the HeNB received {pID i , C 1 }, it forwards them to the MME through the eNB. Once the MME received (pID i , C 1 ), it sends them to HSS/AuC for authentication. -Step 3: After receiving the messages from the MME, the HSS/AuC first retrieves K i by the corresponding rID i = D K H (pID i ) and d by decrypting C 1 with K i . The HSS/AuC then checks if the decrypted pID i is equal to the pID i sent by the UE i. It then selects a new anonymous identity rID i (replace the original rID i with it) and I ∈ {1, k},
, keeps the session key, CK, shared with the UE i, and sends {C 2 , K M,i } back to the MME. -Step 4: After receiving the messages from the HSS/AuC, the MME computes the session key, K eN,i = F (K M,i ), shared with the eNB and the UE i, and sends {C 2 , K eN,i } back to eNB. The eNB keeps K eN,i and sends the session key, K He,i = F (K eN,i ), shared with the UE i. Finally, both eNB and HeNB share K eN,i and K He with the UE i, respectively, for the subsequent secure communications. Afterward, the HeNB sends C 2 to UE i. -Step 5: Upon the receipt of the messages from the HeNB, the UE i extracts {T ID ij , D ij , T ex , d, pID * i } by decrypting C 2 with K i . It then replaces pID i = pID * i , updates T ID ij , and computes the session keys shared with the HSS/AuC, MME, eNB, and HeNB
After the initial handover phase, the visiting region j of the UE i will be recorded by the MME. The UE i will share D ij and pID i , which will be updated for every initial handover session, with the HSS/AuC. If any UE i is revoked, the HSS/AuC will update R 
E. Region-based Fast Handover
When UE i moves from one HeNB to a new HeNB within the same region j, it needs to run the region-based handover authentication. How UE i and the HeNB authenticate each other securely and exchange a session key is described as follows. If the protocol is completed, both UE i and the HeNB are legal and accept each other. The handover protocol is also illustrated in Fig. 4 .
F. Active Revocation
This phase shows the procedure of revoking a UE in the system. When the system revokes the membership of a UE, the HSS/AuC can revoke the issued warrant and long-term secret key as the following.
-Step 1: The system operator provides ID i of the revoked UE i to the HSS/AuC. The HSS/AuC will check all the temporarily anonymous identities and the corresponding warrants unexpired and issued for the UE i. For example, Alice, Bob, and Charles get their warrants at t 0 , t 1 , t 4 , respectively. Assume that all warrants are only valid for one time slot, the warrants of Alice, Bob, and Charles will expire at t 2 , t 3 , t 5 , respectively. If the warrants of Alice and Bob are actively revoked before the expiration times t 2 , t 3 and within S 0 , their warrants will be accumulated into R S0 j . If the active revocation time is before t 2 and t 3 , and within S 1 , the issuing time of R S1 j is after t 2 and t 3 . Hence, the HSS/AuC needs not to accumulate the warrants of Alice and Bob into R S1 j since the warrantes will be revoked passively by the expiration times.
G. Management of User Warrants and Revocation Lists
Similarly, if the warrant of Charles is actively revoked before the expiration times t 5 and within S 1 , the warrant of Charles should be accumulated into the revocation list R S1 j . Otherwise, Charles's warrant will be expired passively after t 5 . The revocation list of each region in every time slot will be produced by the HSS/AuC and sent to the corresponding region for the active revocation of all the unexpired warrants.
Security of Shared Group Key. The eNB and HeNBs in the same region j share the same group key GK j for the regionbased fast handover authentication. Any eNB or HeNB may be accessed physically by adversaries, who intend to retrieve GK j and impersonate a legal UE i by computing a forged D ij in the region j. The system operator can prevent this kind of attacks by adopting trust platform modular (TPM) or Trust Execution Environment (TEE) [43] , which are popular technologies to protect secret keys and compute the related cryptographic operations with the secret keys in dedicated hardware chipset. Additionally, even if the adversary has GK j , she/he cannot pass the region-based fast handover authentication as it requires to send out the correct pID * i , which will be renewed after every communication session. pID * i is considered as additional secret shared among the UE i and eNB/HeNB in the region j. Hence, the proposed ReHand HSS/AuC MME HeNB eNB
Extract Ki by pIDi and (rIDi, d) by decrypting C1 and pIDi
C2
Extract T IDij, Dij, Tex, d, pID * i by Decrypting C2 with Ki. Replace pIDi = pID * i and T IDij.
Select rIDi, I ∈ {1, k} and compute T IDij = {λ = rIDi ⊕ bR [28] , [31] for user anonymous authentication in mobile networks, where the footprint of communication sessions of UE is unlinkable. In the 3GPP standards of mobile networks, each UE has to complete the attachment to the new visiting serving networks with the assistance of the belonging MME and HSS/AuC so that the mobile service provider of the UE can locate its area in case of an incoming voice call. The above two works adopt group signatures [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] to achieve strong user anonymity by which the recipient of the authentication information, made by group signatures with the issued group signing key of distinct user, can only verify the legitimacy by the group public key. That is, only the legal users can produce the valid group signatures on the selected messages by the group signing keys issued from the trust authority. However, strong anonymity causes the impossibility of tracing the location of UEs and results in the failure of incoming voice call service and short message service (SMS). Thus, AKE protocols with strong user anonymity only check the legitimacy of UEs without knowing the exact identity information for services. For the mobile network services requiring the exact identity information to respond the incoming call, which is exactly for the specified UE, the system should supports traceability for conditional user anonymity. Revocation Costs for User Anonymity. User revocation to anonymous AKE is essential to the membership management for accountability in mobile networks. Even if the strong user anonymity can achieve identity untraceability against system operators, the revocation of unsubscribed users should get effected to ensure the accountability. The operations of revocation should be considered as parts of operations in AKE. Hence, the costs evaluation of AKE should include revocation costs in practice.
V. Security Analysis
A. Security Analysis of Initial Handover
Theorem V.1. The proposed mutual authentication and key exchange protocol Π with user anonymity for the Initial Handover phase is secure based on the IND-CCA security of the underlying pseudorandom function and the pseudorandom permutation.
Lemma V.1 (Mutual Authentication in Initial Handover).
The proposed protocol Π in the Initial Handover phase is a secure mutual authentication protocol for UE i and the system (including HeNB, eNB, MME, and HSS/AuC) under the assumption that the underlying pseudorandom permutation Ω is with PRP security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the mutual authentication security of Π by a probabilistic polynomial time adversary E with the simulator Γ, who simulates Π and plays the game in Definition II.6 to break the PRP security. Γ interacts with E by simulating either UE i or the system with the given (Ω, Ω −1 ) by a challenger ψ . It is either a pair of a pseudorandom permutation and its inverse, i.e., (E Ki , D Ki ), or a truly random permutation and its inverse, i.e., (ω, ω −1 ). Γ simulates Π by the following oracle functions to capture the capability of E, where A denotes the UE and B denotes the system in Π.
-Execute(Π Challenge: Before the challenge phase, Γ can query Ω and Ω −1 with the polynomial number of messages as inputs and receive the corresponding outputs for the training besides the training in the above protocol simulation. Then, Γ sends a chosen message ρ = {pID i , d} or ρ = {T ID ij , D ij , T ex , d, pID * i }, which are the messages in the simulation of executing Π with E, to ψ and ψ randomly chooses a bit θ ∈ {0, 1}. If θ = 0, then ψ encrypts ρ by Ω; otherwise, ψ encrypts ρ by ω. ψ outputs π to Γ.
Guess: If E can send out {pID i , C 1 } or {C 2 } correctly by acting as a legal UE or system, , Γ will output θ ′ = θ; otherwise Γ will output θ ′ ∈ {0, 1} randomly. When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real experiment and E has additional advantage to break the mutual authentication of Π. When θ = 1, the above experiment is a random experiment and E has no advantage to break the mutual authentication of Π. Thus, Γ can only exploit the advantage ε of breaking the mutual authentication of Π by E to break the security of PRP, i.e., E Ki and D Ki . τ is the probability of breaking (E Ki , D Ki ). Hence, we have the following.
Since τ is negligible based on the assumption of PRP security, ε is also negligible. Hence, the probability of breaking the mutual authentication of Π in member join phase is negligible.
Lemma V.2 (Key Exchange in Initial Handover). The proposed protocol in the Initial Handover phase is a secure key exchange protocol Π if the adopted underlying pseudorandom function Λ is with PRF security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the key exchange security of Π by E with the simulator Γ, who simulates Π and plays the game in Definition II.6 to break the PRF security. Γ interacts with E by simulating either UE i or the system with the given Λ. It is either a pseudorandom function, i.e., H(d, .), or a truly random permutation, i.e., λ, according to a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1}. Γ simulates Π by the following oracle functions to capture the capability of E, where A denotes the UE and B denotes the system in Π.
-Execute(Π A , Γ will select a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1} and respond CK to E ifθ = 0. Otherwise, Γ responds α to E ifθ = 1. Then, E outputsθ ′ = 0 if it guesses the received output of T est query is the real session key. Otherwise, E outputsθ ′ = 1. When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real experiment and E has additional advantage to break the key exchange security of Π. When θ = 1, the experiment is a random experiment and E has no advantage to break the key exchange security of Π. Hence, ifθ =θ ′ , Γ will output θ = 0. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ = 0 or 1 randomly.
τ is the probability of breaking the PRF security of H(d, .). From the above, we have that
Thus, the probability, ε, of event Distinguish CK (k) of the constructed session key CK by an adversary E is negligible since τ is also negligible based on the PRF security assumption.
Lemma V.3 (User Anonymity in Initial Handover). The proposed protocol Π in the Initial Handover phase is with user anonymity if the adopted underlying pseudorandom permutation Ω is with PRP security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the probability of breaking the user anonymity of Π by E with the simulator Γ, who simulates Π and plays the game in Definition II.6 to break the PRP security. Γ interacts with E by simulating either UE i or the system with the given Λ. It is either a pseudorandom function, i.e., H(d, .), or a truly random permutation, i.e., λ, according to a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1}. Γ simulates Π by Send, Execute, Reveal, and T est to capture the capability of E, which are the same as that in Lemma V.2. Besides that, Γ additionally simulate the following oracles.
-RevealID(Π by Ω. Ω given by ψ is H k for θ = 0 or a random permutation ω for θ = 1. Guess: If E output can guess out the given string is a real pID * i or a random string after querying T estID, then Γ will output θ = 0. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ ∈ {0, 1} randomly. E has additional advantage to break user anonymity when Ω is a pseudorandom permutation (E k ), i.e., θ = 0. When Ω is a random permutation, E has no advantage to break user anonymity. Hence, we have that
τ is negligible based on PRP security assumption. Hence, the probability of breaking user anonymity ε is also negligible.
According to Lemma V.1 Lemma V.2, and Lemma V.3 , Theorem V.1 holds.
B. Security Analysis of Region-based Fast Handover
Theorem V.2. The proposed mutual authentication and key exchange protocol Π ′ with user anonymity for the Regionbased Fast Handover phase of the proposed scheme is secure based on the PRF security. Then, Γ can simulate Π by the oracle functions, Execute and Send, to capture the capability of E, which are the same as that in the proof of Lemma V.1. In Challenge phase, Γ will send the message {r u , r h , K He,i } or r h to Λ ′ 1 or Λ ′ 2 for the corresponding output, δ or δ ′ . In Guess phase, Γ outputs θ ′ = 0 if E outputs the correct δ or δ ′ successfully. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ ′ ∈ {0, 1} randomly. When θ = 0, the above experiment is a real experiment and E has additional probability ε ′ to break the mutual authentication security of Π ′ . When θ = 1, the experiment is a random experiment and E has negligible probability to break mutual authentication security. Hence, we have that
τ ′ 1 is the probability of breaking the PRF security of
is the probability of breaking the PRF security of H(K He,i , .), ε is the probability of breaking the mutual authentication security by sending the correct δ, and ε ′ is the probability of breaking the mutual authentication security by sending the correct δ ′ .
Lemma V.5. The proposed protocol Π ′ in the Region-based Fast Handover phase is a secure key exchange protocol for UE i and the HeNB under the assumption that the the underlying pseudorandom function Λ ′ is with PRF security.
Proof. Assume that ε is the advantage of breaking the key exchange of Π ′ by E. Γ simulates Π ′ with the given Λ by ψ, where Λ = H(D ij , .) if θ = 0; otherwise, Λ is a random function. Then, Γ can simulate Π ′ by the oracle functions, Execute, Send, Reveal, and T est to capture the capability of E, which are the same as that in the proof of Lemma V.5. In Challenge phase, Γ will send the message {r u , r h } to Λ for the corresponding output K He,i .
In Guess phase, Γ will output θ = 0 or θ = 1 randomly if E does not query T est. If E query T est, Γ will respond a real session key K He,i forθ = 0. Otherwise, Γ will respond a random string α. Γ outputs θ = 0 if E outputsθ ′ =θ correctly. Otherwise, Γ outputs θ = 0 or 1 randomly. Hence, we have that
τ is the probability of breaking the PRF security of H(D ij , .). is negligible since τ is also negligible. Therefore, Π ′ guarantees key exchange security based on the PRF security assumption.
Lemma V.6. The proposed protocol Π in the Region-based Fast Handover phase is with user anonymity if k > a × b − b, where k is the number of {bR I j } I∈ [1,k] , b is the number of UEs within the region j, and a is the number of communication sessions launched by a UE in average.
Proof. The region-based fast handover guarantees the user anonymity by T ID ij = rID ij ⊕ bR That is, the number of variables, including the anonymous identities of UEs and the blind factors, are always more than the equations provided by T ID ij 's. Hence, there should be no only solution for each anonymous identity for adversaries to link the communication sessions to any specific UE. Hence, the region-based fast handover ensures user anonymity.
VI. Comparisons
This section compares the performance in communication and computation costs of ReHand with the three prior arts [28] , [31] , [32] , which are also with mutual authentication, session key exchange, user anonymity, conditional traceability, and active revocation for the security requirements of roamingbased AKE in 5G.
A. Computation and Communication Costs
We evaluate the computation/communication costs of the proposed ReHand protocols with the other roaming-based authentication protocols [28] , [31] , [32] on a smartphone of ASUS Zenfone 3 as a UE testbed. The smartphone runs Android 8.0.0 mobile operating system and is equipped with 2.0 GHz octa-core ARM Cortex-A53 CPU and 3GB RAM. The cryptographic libraries for the implementation of the required cryptographic operations in the proposed scheme and the related works are java pairing based cryptography (JPBC) [48] and Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) [49] . The evaluation also run the above cryptographic libraries on a APPLE Macbook Pro (2016 model) with 2.9 GHz dualcore Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM for the estimation of computation costs. Table III shows the total computation cost and the communication costs of the proposed schemes with the three related works [28] , [31] , [32] , and the definitions of the computation times of all operations and the message lengths of all variables.
Regarding the message lengths, the length of an element from G 1 is 170 bits and from G T is 340 bits for the pairing mapping by MNT curves [50] for 80 bits security. The key lengths, L K , of the symmetry-based encryption (i.e., Advanced Encryption Standard, AES), keyed hash function (i.e., Secure Hash Algorithm 2, SHA-2), and their outputs are 128 bits. The lengths of an identity and nonce used in AKE protocol are also 128 bits for the consistency.
In order to evaluate the communication costs among the proposed scheme and the other prior arts empirically, we assume that the eNB/HeNB as visiting authentication node (VAN), which is the closest authentication node to UE, and the HSS/AuC as home authentication node (HAN), which is the authentication node of the belonging home network of UE. Without loss of generality for communication costs, C α denotes the communication time of a unit (i.e., 512-bit as a minimum data frame) between UE and VAN. C β denotes the communication time of a unit between VAN and HAN. Since the communication cost between eNB and HeNB is extremely low as the wired X2 interface is used between them. Besides, the performance metrics define the rate of roaming to a HeNB in a new visiting region as α R and the rate of roaming to a HeNB in a visited region as (1 − α R ) to estimate the effect of handover on the performance by time of the proposed protocols, i.e., Initial Handover and Region-based Handover. In the testbed of the communication evaluation, an WiFi access point (AP) of D-Link DIR-612 N300 with a laptop of APPLE Macbook Pro (2016 model) emulates eNB/HeNB, and two guest operating systems (OSs) of Debian/Linux 9 on the virtual machine of Google Cloud Platform Computer Engine emulate VAN and HAN, respectively. By running each communication experiment for 10,000 times, C α is 4.36 millisecond (ms) and C β is 261.76 ms.
B. Revocation Costs
Revocation check is essential to verify the legality of the membership in the system and considered as a part of authentication. Hence, the costs of revocation check should be evaluated in the performance comparison. Since the revocation list can be updated for every fixed period to reduce the size, the size of revocation list is defined as RL t . For the proposed scheme, the size of the revocation list in a region j at the specific period S t is defined as RL St j . In order to compare the performance unbiased, we also assume that the revocation lists are updated periodically in the other related works [28] , [31] , [32] . In [31] , the revocation list cannot be updated for only specific period of times. Hence, we denote the size of the complete revocation list as RL . Nevertheless, the communication costs are also affected by the update frequency of revocation list. Thus, we define the period of updating revocation list as T RL and the frequency as . The performance evaluation will take the above defined variables related to revocation check into account.
C. Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the effect of roaming to a new region on the performance, the time latency of the proposed protocol is T H−AKE = α R × T I−AKE + (1 − α R ) × T F−AKE , where T I−AKE is the time of Initial Handover and T F−AKE is the time of Region-based Fast Handover.
In this evaluation, we assume that the number of revoked UEs is 1,000,000 1 , the period of updating revocation lists (i.e., T RL ) is from 60 seconds to 3,600 seconds (1 hour), the range of speed, v, of UE is from 0 to 500 kilometer per hour (KM/h), and the diameter, r, of eNB is 2 KMs. Here, the expiration time, T exp , of each warrant is the same as T RL in ReHand. , if α R < 1 1, otherwise.
Based on the given v ∈ [0, 500] KM/h, r = 2 KMs, and T exp ∈ [60, 3600], the range of α R is from 2.78 × 10 −4 to 8.6 × 10 −2 . Figure 6 shows the performance comparison (computation and communication costs) of the proposed ReHand scheme with [28] , [31] , [32] , the ReHand greatly reduces the cost to 82.92% compared with HashHand scheme [32] when T RL ≥ 240 (i.e., ≥ 2 minutes), to 99.99% compared with Time-bound scheme [31] , and to 99.95% compared with CPAL scheme [28] .
VII. Conclusion
This work proposes a region-based secure fast handover framework that is not only tailored to the technical direction of small cell network in 5G, but also combines the properties of secure mutual authentication, privacy preservation, computation efficiency, and functional active revocation. The proposed authentication framework adopts the techniques of group key, one-time identity, and accumulated one-way hash, so that every authentication within the same region only involve UE and the visiting HeNB. We also provide formal security analysis to demonstrate the proposed security scheme is secure based on the cryptographic hard problems. Compared to the other works, the proposed scheme eliminates considerable computation and communication costs for small cell networks in 5G.
